In this article we survey Ásta’s (2008, 2013) conferralist account of essence, which provides a broadly anti-realist picture of essence. We first offer some thoughts on the difference between realist and anti-realist accounts of essence in general. Then we present Ásta’s notion of a conferred property and sketch her conferralist account of essence. Finally, we examine some critical questions conferralism faces.

There are three theories in the epistemology of modality that have received sustained attention over the past 20 years: conceivability-theory, counterfactual-theory, and deduction-theory. In this paper we argue that all three face what we call the problem of modal epistemic friction. One consequence of the problem is that for any of the three accounts to yield modal knowledge, the account must provide an epistemology of essence. We discuss an attempt to fend off the problem within the context of the internalism (...) versus externalism debate about epistemic justification. We then investigate the effects that the PMEF has on reductive and non-reductive theories of the relation between essence and modality. (shrink)

Human Aspiration is the first chapter of the magnum opus book "Life Divine". Here in in this chapter Sri Aurobindo one of the most modern prolific philosophers of Renaissance India has highlighted his focal points as to what Man's eternal aspiration has been, that is, God, Light , Freedom & Eternity. Despite technological and scientific advancements, Mans is still thirsty, it is because he aspires for a Divine Life. The article talks about the "Human aspiration" of eternity in details.

Recently, Kit Fine's (1994) view that modal truths aretrue in virtue of,grounded in, orexplained byessentialist truths has been under attack. In what follows we offer two responses to the wave of criticism against his view. While the first response is pretty straightforward, the second is based on the distinction between, what we call,Reductive Finean EssentialismandNon-Reductive Finean Essentialism. Engaging the work of Bob Hale onNon-Reductive Finean Essentialism, we aim to show that the arguments against Fine's view are unconvincing, while we acknowledge (...) the presence of a deep standoff between the two views. (shrink)

The study aimed to identify the knowledge management processes and their role in achieving competitive advantage at Al-Quds Open University. The study was based on the descriptive analytical method, and the study population consists of academic and administrative staff in each of the branches of Al-Quds Open University in (Tulkarm, Nablus and Jenin). The researchers selected a sample of the study population by the intentional non-probability method, the size of (70) employees. A questionnaire was prepared and supervised by a number (...) of specialists in order to obtain the results of the study. The study concluded that there is a positive direct relationship, that is, the higher the degree of application of knowledge management processes, the greater the degree of competitive advantage. Knowledge Technology came first with a score of 80.02% on all items. Competitive advantage came second with 81.74%. In the third place came "knowledge generation" where the total score on all paragraphs in this area (78.24%). In the fourth place, "knowledge transfer" (77.21%). "Developing and storing knowledge" came in fifth place (77.13%). "Acquisition of knowledge" came in sixth place (76.45%). Knowledge Organization ranked seventh (74.26%). The study recommended that the university should enable the employees to benefit from the experiences and expertise available to help generate knowledge. The University encourages the creation of knowledge through the system of incentives and open the way for creators to apply their creations and spread and invest in excellence and creativity. The university should design work performance levels based on the integration of knowledge and organize it according to policies that support freedom of research. The need for Palestinian universities to adopt a knowledge management approach. The need to adopt a system of incentives that rewards cognitive efforts, and give workers enough freedom to enable them to apply their knowledge. (shrink)

Last year saw the 20th anniversary edition of JECP, and in the introduction to the philosophy section of that landmark edition, we posed the question: apart from ethics, what is the role of philosophy ‘at the bedside’? The purpose of this question was not to downplay the significance of ethics to clinical practice. Rather, we raised it as part of a broader argument to the effect that ethical questions – about what we should do in any given situation – are (...) embedded within whole understandings of the situation, inseparable from our beliefs about what is the case, what it is that we feel we can claim to know, as well as the meaning we ascribe to different aspects of the situation or to our perception of it. Philosophy concerns fundamental questions: it is a discipline requiring us to examine the underlying assumptions we bring with us to our thinking about practical problems. Traditional academic philosophers divide their discipline into distinct areas that typically include logic: questions about meaning, truth and validity; ontology: questions about the nature of reality, what exists; epistemology: concerning knowledge; and ethics: how we should live and practice, the nature of value. Any credible attempt to analyse clinical reasoning will require us to think carefully about these types of question and the relationships between them, as they influence our thinking about specific situations and problems. So, the answers to the question we posed, about the role of philosophy at the bedside, are numerous and diverse, and that diversity is illustrated in the contributions to this thematic edition. (shrink)

As engineering applications require management of ever larger volumes of data, ontologies offer the potential to capture, manage, and augment data with the capability for automated reasoning and semantic querying. Unfortunately, considerable barriers hinder wider deployment of ontologies in engineering. Key among these is lack of a shared top-level ontology to unify and organise disparate aspects of the field and coordinate co-development of orthogonal ontologies. As a result, many engineering ontologies are limited to their scope, and functionally difficult to extend (...) or interoperate with other engineering ontologies. This paper demonstrates how the use of a top-level ontology, specifically the Basic Formal Ontology (BFO), greatly facilitates interoperability of multiple engineering-related ontologies. We constructed a system of formal linked ontologies by re-engineering legacy ontologies to be conformant with BFO and developing new BFO-conformant ontologies to capture knowledge in the engineering design, enterprise, human factors, manufacturing, and application domain of additive manufacturing. The resulting Integrated Framework for Additively Manufactured Products (IFAMP), including the body knowledge instantiated on its basis, serve as the basis for a proposed Design with Additive Manufacturing Method (DWAM), which we believe can support the design of innovative products with semantically enhanced ideation tools and enhanced access to application domain knowledge. The method and its facilitation through the ontological framework are demonstrated using a case study in medicine. (shrink)

Parkinson's Disease (PD) is a long-term degenerative disorder of the central nervous system that mainly affects the motor system. The symptoms generally come on slowly over time. Early in the disease, the most obvious are shaking, rigidity, slowness of movement, and difficulty with walking. Doctors do not know what causes it and finds difficulty in early diagnosing the presence of Parkinson’s disease. An artificial neural network system with back propagation algorithm is presented in this paper for helping doctors in identifying (...) PD. Previous research with regards to predict the presence of the PD has shown accuracy rates up to 93% [1]; however, accuracy of prediction for small classes is reduced. The proposed design of the neural network system causes a significant increase of robustness. It is also has shown that networks recognition rates reached 100%. (shrink)

This study aimed to understand the preserved elements of self-identity in persons with moderate to severe dementia attributable to Alzheimer’s disease. A semi-structured interview was developed to explore the narrative self among residents with dementia in a residential care facility and residents without dementia in an independent living setting. The interviews were transcribed verbatim from audio recordings and analyzed for common themes, while being sensitive to possible differences between the groups. The participants with dementia showed evidence of self-reference even though (...) losses in explicit memory were evident. The most noticeable difference between the two groups was time frame reference. Nonetheless, all participants showed understanding of their role in relationships and exhibited concrete preferences. Our findings suggest that memory loss and other cognitive deficits associated with moderate to severe dementia do not necessarily lead to a loss of “self.”. (shrink)

While several tests and strategies are recommended for colorectal cancer (CRC) screening, studies suggest that primary care providers often recommend colonoscopy without providing information about its risks or alternatives. These observations raise concerns about the quality of informed consent for screening colonoscopy.

Although there is a growing recognition that older adults and those with extensive comorbid conditions undergo cancer screening too frequently, there is little information about patients’ perceptions regarding cessation of cancer screening. Information on older adults’ views of screening cessation would be helpful both for clinicians and for those designing interventions to reduce overscreening.

In this paper, we presented antoher concept of neutrosophic open sets called neutrosophic semi-α-open sets and studied their fundamental poperties in neutrosophic topological spaces. We also present neutrospohic semi-α-interior and neutrosophic semi-α-closure and study some of their fundamental properties.

The comprehensive nature of information and insight available in the Upanishads, the Indian philosophical systems like the Advaita Philosophy, Sabdabrahma Siddhanta, Sphota Vaada and the Shaddarsanas, in relation to the idea of human consciousness, mind and its functions, cognitive science and scheme of human cognition and communication are presented. All this is highlighted with vivid classification of conscious-, cognitive-, functional- states of mind; by differentiating cognition as a combination of cognitive agent, cognizing element, cognized element; formation; form and structure of (...) cognition, instruments and means of cognition, validity of cognition and the nature of energy/matter which facilitates and also is the medium of cognition- cognizing process; and also as the container and content of cognition. The human communication process which is just the reverse of cognizing process is also presented with necessary description and detail. The sameness of cognitive / communicative process during language acquisition and communication processes and the modes of language acquisition and communication are also given. The hardware and software of human cognition, language acquisition and communication as envisaged in Indian spiritual and philosophical expressions are given. In the light of the information and insight obtained as above, the axioms for human cognition / communication are formed, framed and presented. A brain-wave frequency modulation / demodulation model of human cognition, communication and language acquisition and communication process based on Upanishadic expressions, Shaddarsanas and Sabdabrahma Siddhhanta is defined and discussed here. The use of these theories and models and axioms in mind-machine modelling and natural language comprehension branch of artificial intelligence will be put forward and highlighted. (shrink)

Since the millennium, first person accounts of experience have been accepted as philosophically valid, potentially useful sources of information about the nature of mind and self. Several Vedic sciences rely on such first person accounts to discuss experience and consciousness. This paper shows that their insights define the information structure of experience in agreement with a scientific theory of mind fulfilling all presently known philosophical and scientific conditions. Experience has two separate components, its information content, and a separate ‘witness aspect’, (...) which can reflect on all forms of experience, and with training be strengthened until its power of reflection identifies it as the innermost aspect of ‘self’. The Vedic sciences, Sankhya, Yoga and Vedanta develop these themes. Sankhya identifies the different aspects of experience, outer and inner; Yoga practices lead the mind to inner states without information content (samadhi) in which the experience of the witness (sakshi) is strengthened and deepened. Vedanta states the nature of the ‘self’ is to know itself directly without intermediary. All this requires the witness to have a singular loop structure. The information structure of experience therefore has two aspects, information content plus a singular loop endowing it with a subjective sense of ‘Self’. (shrink)

The shift to digital learning platforms has empowered students with access to a broader array of learning resources, interactive content, and personalized learning paths. However, millions of students, particularly those from rural areas or lower-income families, struggle to access these resources due to a lack of digital infrastructure, reliable internet connectivity, and affordability of devices. Furthermore, the role of teachers has evolved, requiring new pedagogical approaches and technical skills to effectively harness these digital tools.

The nature of time is perceived by intellectuals variedly. An attempt is made in this paper to reconcile such varied views in the light of the Upanishads and related Indian spiritual and philosophical texts. The complex analysis of modern mathematics is used to represent the nature and presentation physical and psychological times so differentiated. Also the relation between time and energy is probed using uncertainty relations, forms of energy and phases of matter.

The article addresses the treatment given to the notion of subject in Slavoj Žižek and Robert Kurz. Without aiming at a synthesis between the two radically opposed positions, they are played against one another in order to reveal the unidimensional stances and false steps in the field of the constitution of the struggle for a concrete negation of capitalist society.

There is an intuitive difference in how we think about pluralism and attitudinal diversity in epistemological contexts versus political contexts. In an epistemological context, it seems problematically arbitrary to hold a particular belief on some issue, while also thinking it perfectly reasonable to hold a totally different belief on the same issue given the same evidence. By contrast, though, it doesn’t seem problematically arbitrary to have a particular set of political commitments, while at the same time thinking it perfectly reasonable (...) for someone in a similar position have a totally different set of political commitments. This chapter examines three explanatory theses that might be used to make sense of this difference: (1) that practical commitments are desire dependent in a way that beliefs are not; (2) that there are reasons to be resolute in practical commitments, but not in beliefs; and (3) that compromise in the face of practical political disagreement doesn’t mitigate controversy, whereas compromise in the face of disagreement about mere beliefs does mitigate controversy. (shrink)

A longish (12 page) discussion of Richard Sorabji's excellent book, with a further discussion of what it means for a theory of emotions to be a cognitive theory.

This reply to an ongoing debate between conspiracy theory researchers from different disciplines exposes the conceptual confusions that underlie some of the disagreements in conspiracy theory research. Reconciling these conceptual confusions is important because conspiracy theories are a multidisciplinary topic and a profound understanding of them requires integrative insights from different fields. Specifically, we distinguish research focussing on conspiracy *theories* (and theorizing) from research of conspiracy *belief* (and mindset, theorists) and explain how particularism with regards to conspiracy theories does not (...) mean we cannot define a problematic subclass of conspiracy beliefs, while avoiding the problems of generalism. We hope this reply helps conspiracy theory researchers recognize the differences between studying conspiracy theories and conspiracy beliefs and appreciate the possibilities for fruitful, integrative, and interdisciplinary research. (shrink)

Recent studies of school-age children and adolescents have used social network analyses to characterize selection and socialization aspects of peer groups. Fewer network studies have been reported for preschool classrooms and many of those have focused on structural descriptions of peer networks, and/or, on selection processes rather than on social functions of subgroup membership. In this study we started by identifying and describing different types of affiliative subgroups (HMP- high mutual proximity, LMP- low mutual proximity, and ungrouped children) in a (...) sample of 240 Portuguese preschool children using nearest neighbor observations. Next, we used additional behavioral observations and sociometric data to show that HMP and LMP subgroups are functionally distinct: HMP subgroups appear to reflect friendship relations, whereas LMP subgroups appear to reflect common social goals, but without strong, within-subgroup dyadic ties. Finally, we examined the longitudinal implications of subgroup membership and show that children classified as HMP in consecutive years had more reciprocated friendships than did children whose subgroup classification changed from LMP or ungrouped to HMP. These results extend previous findings reported for North American peer groups. (shrink)

The role of intuition in Kant’s account of experience receives perennial philosophical attention. In this essay, I present the textual case that Kant also makes extensive reference to what he terms “images” that are generated by the imagination. Beyond this, as I argue, images are fundamentally distinct from empirical and pure intuitions. Images and empirical intuitions differ in how they relate to sensation, and all images (even “pure images”) actually depend on pure intuitions. Moreover, all images differ from intuitions in (...) their structure or format. I then turn to a question that naturally arises on the resulting view: if the imagination produces images, and if images are fundamentally distinct from intuitions, then how do intuitions relate to the imagination? I outline reasons for thinking that intuitions and their essential features do not depend on the imagination at all. Though this essay does not decisively argue for this thesis, the resulting view provides a clear account of the distinction between the senses and the imagination in Kant’s theory of sensibility. (shrink)

Библиогр.: с. 190-206.В настоящей книге мы стремились обрисовать контуры нормативной модели смены фундаментальных научных теорий продемонстрировать эффективность ее применения на примере перехода «Лоренц – Эйнштейн». Нелишне еще раз подчеркнуть, что ни сама модель, ни задаваемые ей теоретические реконструкции ни в коей мере не являются окончательными. Единственное, на что претендует автор, – это лишь на то, что они лучше – в определенных аспектах – предложенных к настоящему времени моделей и реконструкций. Поэтому не только нельзя констатировать, что все проблемы – методологического и (...) историко-научного характера (даже сформулированные в начале данного исследования) – полностью и окончательно решены. Напротив, предлагаемая концепция ставит (а иногда по-новому формулирует) ряд сложных и интеречных задач. Перечислим вкратце некоторые из них. Во-первых, желательно выяснить, насколько данная концепция является универсальной, уточнить область ее применимости. Может ли она претендовать на реконструкцию всех процессов смены в истории физики, и если не может, то каких именно? Ответ на последний вопрос представляет для модели исключительный интерес, поскольку он может указать на возможные направления ее дальнейшего совершенствования. Скажем, способна ли наша концепция дать достаточно адекватные описания переходов «Птолемей – Коперник» или «Аристотель – Галилей – Ньютон»? Далее, применима ли наша модель к развитию других естественных наук, скажем, к историям химии и биологии? Может ли она описать переходы «Пристли – Лавуазье» или «Ламарк – Дарвин»? Во-вторых, как «работает» модель в современной физике? Способна ли она указать определенные направления крайне актуального сейчас синтеза общей теории относительности и квантовой теории поля? Некоторые попытки (см., например, Нугаев, 1987) обнадеживают, но до реальных результатов еще далеко. В-третьих, реконструкция научной революциив физике в начале XX века также ставит не меньше проблем чем решает. Несмотря на то, она ориентирует исследователей на единое, целостное рассмотрение двух рассматривавшихся, как правило, изолированно, научных революций – квантовой и релятивистской – встает вопрос о более детальном рассмотрении взаимодействия «эйнштейновской» и «боровской» программ. Дальнейшее продвижение в этом направлении предполагает рассмотрение, возможно, под новым углом зрения, истории становления квантовой механики начиная с 20-х годов. И, наконец, последней (отнюдь не по важности) является проблема взаимодействия когнитивных и социальных факторов в процессе смены фундаментальных теорий. Иногда отказ от стандартной гипотетико-дедуктивной интерпретации естественнонауч-ной теории (см. подробнее введение) воспринимается как свидетельство в пользу так называемой «сильной программы» социологии науки, сформулированной Д. Блуром, с. Барнсом и др. (см., например, обзор «Современная западная социология науки», 1988). С точки зрения сторонников этой программы, движущие силы развития научного познания определяются не внутренними факторами развития науки, а ее социокультурным окружением. Именно последнее оказывает решающее влияние на смену фундаментальных теорий. Например, согласно работе американского историка науки П. Формана «Веймарская культура, причинность и квантовая теория», причиной перехода от классической механики к квантовой было распространение среди немецких физиков экзистенциалистской « философии жизни», характеризующейся антагонизмом к рациональности. Одним из каналов, через который индетерминистские настроения «проникали» в среду немецких ученых, была философия Шпенглера (см. подробнее Мамчур, 1987). Как справедливо (там же) отмечает Е. А. Мамчур, необходимо проводить различие между социальной природой познания, его социокультурной обусловленностью и социокультурной детермина-цией. Концепция социальной природы познания – важнейший принцип гносеологии: подлинным субъктом познания является все человеческое общество. Согласно тезису о социокультурной обусловленности познания, разделяемому подавляющим большинством исследователей (см., например, Бляхер и Волынская, 1976; Казютинский, 1979; Карпинская, 1980; Кузнецова, 1984; Пахомов, 1985 и др.), социокультурные факторы через философию, картину мира, идеалы научного познания оказывают определенное влияние на процесс научного познания. Но тезис о социокультурной детерминации требует, чтобы социокультурные факторы определяли саму внутреннюю логику развития науки и, как таковой, вызывает определенные трудности в интерпретации различных периодов развития науки (подробнее см. Мамчур, 1987). (shrink)

The concept of neutrosophic locally compact and neutrosophic compact open topology are introduced and some interesting propositions are discussed.

In the quest for mental peace and philosophical insight, the most profound approach is to let the mind function freely, without the interference of a controlling thinker. This essay explores the philosophical and cognitive implications of an unimpeded mind, drawing from Eastern traditions such as Zen Buddhism and Taoism, alongside contemporary cognitive science. It argues that the natural rhythm of thought is disrupted by the ego’s need for control, leading to mental fragmentation and turbulence. By embracing the concept of “no-mind” (...) or non-interference, individuals can achieve a harmonious flow of consciousness. Contemporary cognitive science supports this view, showing that reducing self-referential thinking enhances cognitive flexibility and emotional regulation. This harmonious state, akin to the flow experienced by top athletes and artists, offers a path to greater psychological well-being and deeper philosophical understanding. (shrink)

In A Priori Justification, Albert Casullo argues that extant attempts to explicate experiential justification—by stipulation, introspection, conceptual analysis, thought experimentation, and/or appeal to intuitions about hypothetical cases—are unsuccessful. He draws the following conclusion: “armchair methods” such as these are inadequate to the task. Instead, empirical methods should be used to investigate the distinction between experiential and non-experiential justification and to address questions concerning the nature, extent, and existence of the a priori. In this essay, I show that Casullo has not (...) refuted armchair explications of experiential justification, in particular those that appeal to introspectively accessible phenomenology. I do this by presenting a phenomenal theory of experiential justification that (a) has a significant degree of initial plausibility and (b) survives Casullo’s general attack on such theories. As a result, a premise in the central argument for Casullo’s signature proposal concerning the a priori is undermined. (shrink)

The exploration of the mind is a fundamental pursuit spanning philosophy and psychology, with implications reaching into diverse practical realms. This paper delves into the intricacies of mental states, examining historical perspectives from ancient philosophers to modern theorists. Philosophical inquiries into intentionality, consciousness, and the nature of mental phenomena are scrutinized, alongside empirical investigations by psychologists. The discourse navigates through contrasting theories such as dualism, materialism, and functionalism, shedding light on the challenges of reconciling subjective experiences with objective observations. The (...) problem of other minds and the tension between internalism and externalism are dissected, revealing the complex interplay between individual cognition and external influences. Ultimately, this analysis underscores the intricate nature of philosophical inquiries into consciousness and the mind. (shrink)

According to the so-called Classical Theory, concepts are mentally represented by individually necessary and jointly sufficient application conditions. One of the principal empirical objections against this view stems from evidence that people judge some instances of a concept to be more typical than others. In this paper we present and discuss four empirical studies that investigate the extent to which this ‘typicality effect’ holds for the concept of basic needs. Through multiple operationalizations of typicality, our studies yielded evidence for a (...) strong effect of this kind: Participants tended to recall the same core examples of the concept in a free-listing task. They judged some basic needs to be more typical than others. The items that were judged to be more typical were listed more frequently in the free-listing task. These items were listed earlier on in the free-listing task. Typical basic needs, as well as non needs, were classified faster than atypical basic needs in a reaction time study. These findings suggest that the concept of basic needs may have a non-classical structure. If so, the quest for a simple and robust intensional analysis of the concept may be futile. (shrink)

The article “Philosophy is crucial in the age of AI” by Anthony Grayling and Brian Ball explores the significant role philosophy has played in the development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and its continuing relevance in guiding the future of AI technologies. The authors trace the historical contributions of philosophers and logicians, such as Gottlob Frege, Kurt Godel, and Alan Turing, in shaping the foundational principles of AI. They argue that philosophical inquiry remains essential, especially in addressing complex issues like consciousness, (...) creativity, and the alignment of AI with human values. The article emphasizes the interdisciplinary collaboration needed to navigate the ethical and societal challenges posed by advancing AI systems, suggesting that philosophy is crucial in ensuring these technologies develop responsibly and ethically. (shrink)

The concept of the mind in philosophy encompasses a diverse range of theories and perspectives, examining its immaterial nature, unitary function, self-activity, self-consciousness, and persistence despite bodily changes. This paper explores the attributes of the mind, addressing classical materialism, dualism, and behaviorism, along with contemporary theories like functionalism and computational functionalism. Key philosophical debates include the mind-body problem, the subjectivity of mental states, and the epistemological and conceptual challenges in understanding other minds. Contrasting views from Aristotle, Descartes, Wittgenstein, and modern (...) philosophers like U.T. Place, Gilbert Ryle, and Hilary Putnam are analyzed. The paper also discusses the implications of these theories on our understanding of mental phenomena, consciousness, and the nature of human experience. (shrink)

The thesis of this article is that there has never been any ground for the controversy between the doctrine of free will and determinism, that it is based upon a misapprehension, that the two assertions are entirely consistent, that one of them strictly implies the other, that they have been opposed only because of our natural want of the analytical imagination. In so saying I do not tamper with the meaning of either phrase. That would be unpardonable. I mean free (...) will in the natural and usual sense, in the fullest, the most absolute sense in which for the purposes of the personal and moral life the term is ever employed. I mean it as implying responsibility, merit and demerit, guilt and desert. I mean it as implying, after an act has been performed, that one " could have done otherwise " than one did. I mean it as conveying these things also, not in any subtly modified sense but in exactly the sense in which we conceive them in life and in law and in ethics. These two doctrines have been opposed because we have not realised that free will can be analysed without being destroyed, and that determinism is merely a feature of the analysis of it. And if we are tempted to take refuge in the thought of an "ultimate ", an "innermost" liberty that eludes the analysis, then we have implied a deterministic basis and constitution for this liberty as well. For such a basis and constitution lie in the idea of liberty. -/- The thesis is not, like that of Green or Bradley, that the contending opinions are reconciled if we adopt a certain metaphysic of the ego, as that it is timeless, and identifies itself with a desire by a " timeless act". This is to say that the two are irreconcilable, as they are popularly supposed to be, except by a theory that delivers us from the conflict by taking us out of time. Our view on the contrary is that from the natural and temporal point of view itself there never was any need of a reconciliation but only of a comprehension of the meaning of terms. (The metaphysical nature of the self and its identity through time is a problem for all who confront memory, anticipation, etc.; it has no peculiar difficulties arising from the present problem.) -/- I am not maintaining that determinism is true; only that it is true insofar as we have free will. That we are free in willing is, broadly speaking, a fact of experience. That broad fact is more assured than any philosophical analysis. It is therefore surer than the deterministic analysis of it, entirely adequate as that in the end appears to be. But it is not here affirmed that there are no small exceptions, no slight undetermined swervings, no ingredient of absolute chance. All that is here said is that such absence of determination, if and so far as it exists, is no gain to freedom, but sheer loss of it; no advantage to the moral life, but blank subtraction from it. -- When I speak below of "the indeterminist" I mean the libertarian indeterminist, that is, him who believes in free will and holds that it involves indetermination. (shrink)

Trope theory is a leading metaphysical theory in analytic ontology. One of its classic statements is found in the work of Donald C. Williams who argued that tropes qua abstract particulars are the very alphabet of being. The concept of an abstract particular has been repeatedly attacked in the literature. Opponents and proponents of trope theory alike have levelled their criticisms at the abstractness of tropes and the associated act of abstraction. In this paper I defend the concept of a (...) trope qua abstract particular by rejecting arguments that purport to show that tropes should not be understood as abstract and by arguing that the abstractness of tropes plays an indispensable role in one of our more promising trope-theoretic analyses of universals and of concrete objects. (shrink)

Political liberals ask citizens not to appeal to certain considerations, including religious and philosophical convictions, in political deliberation. We argue that political liberals must include a demanding requirement of intellectual modesty in their ideal of citizenship in order to motivate this deliberative restraint. The requirement calls on each citizen to believe that the best reasoners disagree about the considerations that she is barred from appealing to. Along the way, we clarify how requirements of intellectual modesty relate to moral reasons for (...) deliberative restraint. And we argue against attempts to weaken our requirement of intellectual modesty by emphasizing those moral reasons. (shrink)

This paper sets mathematics among the sciences, despite not being empirical, because it studies relations of various sorts, like the sciences. Each empirical science studies the relations among objects, which relations determining which science. The mathematical science studies relations as such, regardless of what those relations may be or be among, how relations themselves are related. This places it at the extreme among the sciences with no objects of its own (A Subject with no Object, by J.P. Burgess and G. (...) Rosen). Examples are discussed. The historical development of written mathematics from algorithms on clay tablets to theorems with proofs is said to show that application of algorithms to specific problems and theorems to scientific objects is like allegorical interpretation. Mathematics fits into the modern scientific context because the sciences, beginning with Galileo, have been constructed in imitation of mathematics. Viewing mathematics this way does not solve any ontological problems, but it does show how mathematics avoids them. Epistemological problems, insuperable for object realism, are simplified. For example, we have access to relations among any objects that we can consider objectively, first physical objects and then mathematical objects of greater and greater abstraction. (shrink)

In his book “Minds and Computers: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence”, Matt Carter presents a comprehensive exploration of the philosophical questions surrounding artificial intelligence (AI). Carter argues that the development of AI is not merely a technological challenge but fundamentally a philosophical one. He delves into key issues like the nature of mental states, the limits of introspection, the implications of memory decay, and the functionalist framework that allows for the possibility of AI. Carter contrasts functionalism with (...) reductive materialism, highlighting how the former accommodates the concept of artificial minds. He also emphasizes the significance of computationalism, which combines functionalism with computational theory to provide a robust explanation for mental processes. The book further discusses formal systems, the role of register machines in computation, and the inherent challenges in AI research, particularly in developing natural language processing systems. Carter’s work underscores the limitations of current computational models of cognition while remaining hopeful that advances in neuroscience may lead to stronger AI systems in the future. (shrink)

In the digital age, the concept of identity has evolved in ways that challenge long-held philosophical assumptions about the self. No longer has fixed or continuous, identity become fragmented, shaped by multiple digital personas that people craft in response to the ever-expanding digital universe. Now, there is no sense of a fixed self that remains constant throughout space and time. Self and identity can be seen as a Heraclitean flux always in a state of becoming and never for a moment (...) being in a state of being. The boundaries between the real and the virtual have blurred, and hyperreal experiences now often seem more significant than actual events. This review delves into the complex relationship between selfhood and digital representation, exploring how traditional theories like Baudrillard’s hyperreality and Buddhist notions of impermanence help explain this transformation. It examines the implications of digital simulations, especially in the context of digital immortality, which raises profound questions about consciousness, existence, and the essence of being. In a world where avatars, social media profiles, and virtual realities dominate, self navigates an uncertain terrain between reality and simulation. This study is an exploration of the evolving nature of identity, consciousness, and human experience in the age of digital fragmentation, with a focus on the philosophical and psychological dimensions of selfhood in the modern, digitized world. (shrink)

Experimental philosophers track folk intuitions better than armchair reflection. Yet, many of them are stuck in a controversy: on the one hand they have vividly shown how untrustworthy intuition is. On the other, they depend all their theorising on the intuitions recorded. If intuition is unreliable, though, why does it make it bet- ter to rely on the intuitions of the many? A mistake is not less a mistake if made by many.

Judging the warrant of conspiracy theories can be difficult, and often we rely upon what the experts tell us when it comes to assessing whether particular conspiracy theories ought to be believed. However, whereas there are recognised experts in the sciences, I argue that only are is no such associated expertise when it comes to the things we call `conspiracy theories,' but that the conspiracy theorist has good reason to be suspicious of the role of expert endorsements when it comes (...) to conspiracy theories and their rivals. The kind of expertise, then, we might associate with conspiracy theories is largely improvised—in that it lacks institutional features—and, I argue, ideally the product of a community of inquiry. (shrink)

Philosophers who work on desert-adjustment within axiology often articulate the concept of desert as follows: x deserves y on the basis of z. This formulation allows for a focused examination that encompasses deservers, deservings, and desert bases. I call this first-order desert. This paper posits that axiology grounded solely in first-order desert fails to adequately capture our nuanced intuitions concerning desert. I contend that to construct an axiology that more effectively aligns with our desert-sensitive intuitions, we must incorporate considerations of (...) second-order desert. Second-order desert is defined as follows: x deserves to live a life in which x deserves y on the basis of z. Initially, I provide a definition of first-order desert, followed by an elucidation of second-order desert. Subsequently, I explore various counter-arguments against my proposition. I defend my proposal against potential counter-arguments, demonstrating that a desert-adjusted axiological theory will be significantly better-off by incorporating second-order desert considerations. (shrink)

l. There is an antinomy in Hare's thought between Ought-Implies-Can and No-Indicatives-from-Imperatives. It cannot be resolved by drawing a distinction between implication and entailment. 2. Luther resolved this antinomy in the l6th century, but to understand his solution, we need to understand his problem. He thought the necessity of Divine foreknowledge removed contingency from human acts, thus making it impossible for sinners to do otherwise than sin. 3. Erasmus objected (on behalf of Free Will) that this violates Ought-Implies-Can which he (...) supported with Hare-style ordinary language arguments. 4. Luther a) pointed out the antinomy and b) resolved it by undermining the prescriptivist arguments for Ought-Implies-Can. 5. We can reinforce Luther's argument with an example due to David Lewis. 6. Whatever its merits as a moral principle, Ought-Implies-Can is not a logical truth and should not be included in deontic logics. Most deontic logics, and maybe the discipline itself, should therefore be abandoned. 7. Could it be that Ought-Conversationally-Implies-Can? Yes - in some contexts. But a) even if these contexts are central to the evolution of Ought, the implication is not built into the semantics of the word; b) nor is the parallel implication built into the semantics of orders; and c) in some cases Ought conversationally implies Can, only because Ought-Implies-Can is a background moral belief. d) Points a) and b) suggest a criticism of prescriptivism - that Oughts do not entail imperatives but that the relation is one of conversational implicature. 8. If Ought-Implies-Can is treated as a moral principle, Erasmus' argument for Free Will can be revived (given his Christian assumptions). But it does not 'prove' Pelagianism as Luther supposed. A semi-Pelagian alternative is available. (shrink)

This essay explores the psychological freedom that emerges from the acceptance of death, arguing that it should not be seen as merely a one-sided freedom of death without the complementary freedom of life. While death is often met with dread and fear, it can foster a sense of authenticity and alignment with personal values. However, this realization must also emphasize the importance of life, as the goal of psychological well-being lies in living, not just acknowledging death. This balance allows us (...) to live fully, prioritize meaningful experiences, and discard trivial concerns. By drawing on Carl Sagan’s reflections on humanity’s insignificance within the cosmos, this essay encourages empowered and responsible living that embraces both life and death. (shrink)

This paper explores the nature of hate, forgiveness, and interconnectedness in human relationships. Hatred often arises from conflicts with personal expectations but can be transformed into forgiveness by adopting an impersonal, holistic perspective. Drawing on evolutionary theory, psychological insights, and Buddhist philosophy, the paper argues that forgiveness is essential for individual mental well-being and societal harmony. The Buddhist concept of “two arrows” illustrates that while pain is unavoidable, suffering stems from emotional reactions and can be mitigated. Embracing the interconnected nature (...) of events allows individuals to transcend psychological suffering and cultivate compassion. Forgiveness, distinct from condoning or forgetting, is a profound process of healing and self-liberation with significant implications for mental and physical health. By integrating philosophical and psychological perspectives, the paper highlights forgiveness as a biological and psychological necessity, improving mental health, life satisfaction, and fostering both personal and communalistic harmony. (shrink)

Sören Halldén’s logic of nonsense is one of the most well-known many-valued logics available in the literature. In this paper, we discuss Peter Woodruff’s as yet rather unexplored attempt to advance a version of such a logic built on the top of a constructive logical basis. We start by recalling the basics of Woodruff’s system and by bringing to light some of its notable features. We then go on to elaborate on some of the difficulties attached to it; on our (...) way to offer a possible solution to such difficulties, we discuss the relation between Woodruff’s system and two-dimensional semantics for many-valued logics, as developed by Hans Herzberger. (shrink)